The Sino-Indian War of 1962 by Das Gupta Amit Luthi Lorenz M

Author:Das Gupta, Amit,Luthi, Lorenz M.
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)
Published: 2016-10-19T16:00:00+00:00

Sino-Pakistani border negotiations

On 15 January 1961, Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir announced China’s readiness to negotiate.45 Acting Foreign Secretary Murshed informed the British High Commission that whereas Beijing ‘wanted demarcation of the entire border with Pakistan, Pakistanis were concerned only with the 150-mile border between China and Hunza. Pakistanis considered that the remainder of the border lay in territory which was sub judice’.46 By February, Ayub appeared to have changed his mind, declaring his readiness to hold talks about the border as a whole as ‘Pakistan was “very much in legal occupation of the territory which runs along China” and had every right to hold talks with that country on border demarcation’, thereby repudiating Nehru’s statement that India would not accept any such decision.47 In March, Finance Minister Mohamed Shoaib, the first member of cabinet to visit Washington after the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy, told his hosts that his government concluded that the Chinese ‘were prepared to reach a settlement, if only to bring pressure on India (he laughed). He said that the ChiComs [Chinese Communists] would say that they were able to reach an agreement on their border with Burma, Nepal, and Pakistan and that the Indians were at fault not agreeing also’.48 A few weeks later, Ayub confirmed to US Ambassador W. Averell Harriman that his government had taken ‘some steps to “normalize” Pakistan’s relations with China and the USSR’, assuring his counterpart that the United States could further count on his country ‘as true friend and ally’. He wanted to ‘avoid trouble with China’ without embarrassing India. Shoaib confirmed that Pakistan was keen to discuss the border as a whole, not only in Hunza.49 In notable contrast to India, the Pakistani government held that notwithstanding attempts during the Raj the border ‘continued to remain undefined’. Expressing gratefulness for US aid and arms, it, however, also emphasized ‘that the West has offered little political assistance to Pakistan’.50 This was a reference to the Kashmir dispute and a hint that Islamabad had more options than exclusive cooperation with the United States.

Within the Ministry of External Affairs, a cell was formed to research the border question, and survey parties were sent into the mountains, whereas Beijing remained silent.51 Further developments throughout 1961 remain unknown. The narrative in Ayub’s memoirs, uncritically taken over by most scholars, in any case does not make sense against the documentary evidence provided above. Allegedly when towards the end of the year Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Ding Guoyu asked for support for his country’s membership in the UN, the president made this dependent on negotiations on border demarcation – on which both sides had agreed eleven months ago. According to Ayub general agreement had been reached by December 1961.52 Most likely this was the outcome of informal talks throughout the year, which had been kept secret from Washington above all. Kennedy had distinguished himself as a friend of India, and the pro-Indian leanings among his staff were well known. Pakistan needed to reassure the confidence of the new US administration.

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